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This paper considers a dynamic model of the evolution of open source software projects, 
focusing on the evolution of quality, contributing programmers, and users who contribute 
customer support to other users. Programmers who have used open source software are 
motivated by reciprocal altruism to publish their own improvements. The evolution of the 
open-source project depends on the form of the altruistic benefits: in a base case the project 
grows to a steady-state size from any initial condition; whereas adding a need for customer 
support makes zero-quality a locally absorbing state. We also analyze competition by 
commercial firms with OSS projects. Optimal pricing policies again vary: in some cases the 
commercial firm will set low prices when the open-source project is small; in other cases it 
mostly waits until the open-source project has matured. 
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Open source software (OSS) has many varieties, but common features are that code is
freely available and contributions are made by a diuse set of programmers often working
as volunteers. Well-known success stories include Linux, Apache, which dominates the
market for web servers, and PERL and PHP, which are leaders in scripting software. But
OSS is a much broader phenomenon: as of February, 2009, SourceForge.net hosted 230,000
OSS projects and had two million million registered users. There is a great deal of diversity
in both project characteristics and outcomes: projects aim to serve very dierent user bases;
have dierent internal organization; and some have thrived while others have risen and fallen
(or never risen at all). There is also diversity in the relationships between commercial rms
and OSS. Some software companies compete directly with open source projects in critical
areas, e.g. Windows Server competes with Apache, but it is also common for rms to
actively support open source projects.1
Though recent, the literature on open-source software has developed rapidly. It now
contains both enlightening theoretical papers and convincing empirical analyses that present
ndings derived from diverse methodologies. The largest part of this literature focuses
on why individual programmers join open-source projects and contains evidence for the
importance of both economic career-concern and noneconomic intrinsic motivations.2 A
smaller literature presents insights on competition between open-source and traditional
software products.3
Our paper is somewhat dierent from most of the literature. One dierence is our
focus on dynamics: we seek to understand patterns of growth and decline and how the
composition of an OSS community changes over time. Another is the nature of our models:
1Lerner et al. (2006) report that the fraction of corporate contributors to open source projects ranges
from 22% for the smallest projects to 44% for the largest. IBM is a particularly noted supporter of open
source and claims to have invested billions. A sample description (in an interview of James Stallings by
Linuxplanet.com) is:
LP: I'd like to ask you a few things about IBM's Linux Technology Center. You have about
250 people working there. Can you tell me exactly what they're doing with their time? Are
they helping customers or developing the kernel, or doing other work?
Stallings: They're making contributions. Their full time job is making contributions to the
kernel. That's it. They don't have another job sweeping the oor or working on Websphere
or anything like that.
2See, among many others we'll discuss later, Lerner and Tirole (2002) for an early theoretical analysis
and Fershtman and Gandal (2007) and Lakhani and Wolf (2003) for empirical evidence of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations, respectively.
3Two noteworthy papers here are Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) and Economides and Kat-
samakas (2006).
1we start from the premise that open-source contributors have altruistic motivations and
develop fairly simple evolutionary models to explore how this aects the performance of the
organization. Our rst main focus here is on how characteristics of product, characteristics
of the user/programmer population, and particularly the nature of programmers' altruistic
motivations aect an open-source movement over time. We also explore how commercial
software rms will price strategically when facing open source compeitition and what impact
this has. Among our observations are that whether open-source projects face a \critical
mass" hurdle depends on the form of altruistic preferences; and that competitors will also
behave dierently in dierent situations: in some circumstances strategic pricing mostly
occurs after an OSS project has reached its steady-state size; whereas in others a commercial
rm will aggressively confront an OSS project when it is small.
An open source movement is comprised of many individuals who contribute to the
development, improvement, and debugging of the code, provide customer support, and/or
decide to use what has been developed. Our main goal is to explore how outcomes at
the community level are aected by features of the environment and by the motivations of
the individuals involved. Without denying the relevance of traditional economic incentives,
surveys of OSS communities typically report that other motivations are also important.4
Our approach is particularly inuenced by the descriptions of Shah (2006). She reports
that individuals typically rst become involved with an open source community when they
have a need that they meet by using the software. She reports that the most commonly
cited reason for remaining involved for at least a brief period is a sense of reciprocity, e.g.
\Others helped me, so I should help them," and that participation becomes a hobby for a
a much smaller number of deeply involved participants.
Our formal model is of a software product which at any point in time can meet a
fraction of the \needs" of a community. We refer to the fraction of needs that a product
meets as its \quality" and assume that this naturally depreciates over time (perhaps because
new needs such as compatibility with new hardware and software become mroe relevant).
These declines can be oset by improvements made by a community of programmers.
We assume that programmers are motivated by both their own needs and by a form of
reciprocal altruism akin to that in Akerlof (1982) and Rabin (1993): altruistic feelings arise
when a programmer uses the product (something that is more likely when the quality is
high), and then decay over time. Without altruism, a programmer might develop a new
feature, but would never publish it and make it available to other users. The community of
4See, for example, Lakhani and Wolf (2003) and Hertel et al. (2003).
2altruistic programs may grow or shrink inuenced by the quality of the software, and the
quality of the OSS increases or decreases over time inuenced by the number of altruistic
programmers. In our baseline model, the programmers are the only players, and we consider
how the dynamics and steady state qualities of OSS projects vary with factors such as the
importance of altruism relative to the eort costs of publication and programming, as well
as the depreciation rates of altruism and software features.
This simple model yields some interesting baseline predictions. First, there is always a
steady state with zero quality and no altruistic programmers. However, so long as the ow
of opportunities to add software and develop altruism are large relative to the depreciation
of altruism and features, there is also a positive steady state. The dynamics of our simple
model are somewhat dierent from what one might expect from informal discussions of open
source software as being dependent on \network externalities." Starting from any initial
condition with some features implemented in the software, the system converges to this
the higher steady state. So in this baseline model, initial conditions and founder behavior
have little to do with the long-run success of the project. However, the system requires
both altruistic individuals and quality to grow; if a formerly commercial product becomes
OSS, and there is no stock of altruistic programmers at the beginning, the quality of the
product may fall for some time until enough programmers join the community and become
altruistic so that features are regenerated faster than they depreciate.
We turn next to consider competition between a commercial software rm and an OSS
project. In particular, we consider optimal pricing by a single competitor to an OSS project.
We assume that the dynamics of OSS projects are determined by individual programmers
acting independently as in the baseline model (rather than directed by a forward-looking,
strategic leader). The optimal strategy of the commercial rm is given by the solution to a
dynamic programming problem, which makes our model of competing with OSS somewhat
dierent from that standard analyses of strategic interactions between competing rms.
As long as the importance of altruism is not above a critical level, the commercial rm
strategically prices below its static best response in an eort to slow the growth of the
OSS project. The magnitudes of the strategic price distortions are more interesting. They
depend on several factors including the loss in short-run prots from a price cut; the degree
to which a price cut of given magnitude aects the state variables; and the persistence
of changes in the state variables. We present some numerical examples, and note that
distortions can be largest when the OSS project is near its steady-state size, because in
other states evolutionary forces are more powerful and changes to the state variables are
3less persistent.
Section 5 extends the model to incorporate another feature of open-source communities
that features prominently in descriptive papers: community members who lack the expertise
to contribute code, but are actively involved in providing \customer support" to new users
{ they answer the many easy questions on bulletin board that expert programmers have
neither the time nor the inclination to deal with. In particular, we add to our model a
population of users and imbue them with similar altruism. Users can become altruistic for
a time when the product meets their need, altruistic users provide customer support, and
the fraction of users whose needs are met is assumed to be increasing in the amount of
customer service that is being provided. Another new specication question that comes up
is what motivates altruistic programmers: are they altruistic toward the code and value
any contributions they make equally; or are they altruistic toward the user populations and
value making contributions more when more users will take advantage of them. One result
of this section is that the system dynamics are qualititatively dierent depending on the
form of programmers' altruism. Another is that the model can have \critical mass" eects.
Whereas in our base model an OSS project can grow (albeit slowly) from any nonzero initial
state, our model with customer service can be such that a substantial initial push of some
type would be needed to prevent the project from collapsing to a zero-quality state.
The dierences in dynamics will have implications for the behavior of competitors.
When critical mass eects are present, a commercial competitor to an OSS project may
want to set very low prices in the early stage of an OSS project's lifecycle to drive it below
critical mass, rather than mostly waiting until the project is more mature before pricing
strategically.
As noted above, our paper is contributing to a literture on open source that is now
substantial. Lerner and Tirole (2002) does a nice job of laying out the economics of con-
tributions to open source. They consider immediate and delayed benets of contributing.
Immediate benets include monetary compensation (for contributors paid by other employ-
ers, or rarely, those employed by the OSS project), own-use benets, and the opportunity
cost of time; long-term benets include ego gratication from peer recognition and the more
standard career concerns, since contributors may signal their ability to a wide community
through OSS participation.
Lerner and Tirole (2005a) consider the implications of career concern issues on the
design of OSS licenses, and how the choice of licenses varies with characteristics of the
project. They nd suggestive evidence in favor of their theory using data from Source-
4Forge.net. Fershtman and Gandal (2007) also present data on contributions consistent
with career-concerns motivations. Other papers provide evidence that other motivations
are also relevant. Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) emphasize that helping others users
provides direct learning benets as well as costs. Hertel et al. (2003) and Shah (2004)
note that a variety of benets are mentioned in surveys including the simple enjoyment of
participation that Stern (2004) argues is important for scientists.
Kuan (2001) considers a model of the OSS production function, where users contribute
to the public good of the quality of the product. One feature it shares with the model in
the latter part of our paper is that there are two types of users. Programmers contribute
code and users report bugs. Johnson (2003) also analyzes OSS as a public good. The
paper argues that a number of stylized facts about OSS can be understood by analyzing
OSS through this lens, including things such as underprovision of documentation. More
broadly, a wider user/developer base increases the quality of a project. Our model is related
to these in that it incorporates the public good aspect of contributions to OSS. Programmers
do not necessarily internalize the full benets of publishing and sharing their code when
they choose whether to write code, rather they consider the private benets from using the
code. However, we include altruism as a motive for publishing code, and we assume that
generally, altruism is sucient to outweigh publication costs, and may be large enough to
induce some code to be written (in anticipation of future publication).
Johnson and Myatt (2006) is another interesting paper that highlights mechanisms
through which the open-source organizational form can be benecial. It compares the
incentives for reporting errors within OSS and commercial products, hypothesizing that
commercial projects create incentives for programmers to collude and suppress information
about errors, since reporting errors may damage the reputation and career of the responsible
programmer. The large number of individuals who can see and work with OSS code makes
that type of collusion dicult to sustain in OSS projects.
Our analysis of competition between commercial and open source products follows at a
smaller number of previous papers. Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) discuss welfare issues in
competition between open source and commercial software. Economides and Katsamakas
(2006) study a platform-competition problem in which a critical consideration is the va-
riety of complementary applications that will be developed on each platform. Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) analyze a dynamic competition model. Their model takes
as given that an OSS product exists and can commit to a price of zero for the product.
Consumer demand for products is characterized by network externalities. The paper shows
5that the commercial product can avoid being pushed out of the market by forward-looking
pricing policies, whereby the commercial rm always prices low enough to ensure itself a
large enough installed base to ensure continued existence. Our approach is complementary
to theirs, in that we allow for much richer dynamics in the OSS product, and we model the
forces behind these dynamics. We do not, however, incorporate exogenous network exter-
nalities in the product market{instead, the size of the installed base aects the quality and
viability of the OSS product through the creation and can be thought of as an endogenous
network externality.
Our paper is also generally part of the recent literature on boundely rational industrial
organization.5 Whereas most of this literature is concerned with how rational rms price
when confronted with behavioral consumers, our paper can be thought of as more closely
related to the older literatures discussed in Ellison (2006) in which the rms were non-
rational entities.
2 A Baseline Model
This section introduces our baseline model, where we focus only on software contributors
(henceforth \programmers"). Consider a population of software programmers of unit mass.
At Poisson random times each programmer is confronted with a need drawn from a set of
needs N = [0;1]. Assume that the arrival times and the needs themselves are independent
across programmers. Let  be the parameter of the need arrival process.
At each time t the open source software package meets some subset St  N of the needs.
Write qt for the Lebesgue measure of St. We'll refer to qt as the quality of the software.
The quality is a key outcome variable for the OSS project, and so we will be interested
in how it evolves over time. In our baseline model, quality does not directly aect the set
of programmers who consider using the product, although (as we see below) it indirectly
aects the provision of new code through the encouragement of altruistic behavior.
Software programmers maximize lifetime discounted utility. Assume that an increment
to utility is received whenever a need arises. The increment depends on the action taken
by the programmer. Our assumptions about these increments are intended to capture
reciprocal altruism. Specically, assume that the increment to programmer i's utility when
he faces need nit at t is:
5See among others Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004), Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
Spiegler (2006a, 2006b), Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), Kamenica (2008), and
Ellison and Ellison (2009).
6Bit if the need is met using the open source software (possible if nit 2 St);
Bit   E if the need is met by programming;
Bit   E   K + ait
if the need is met by programming and the programmer then adds
the code to the open source project (possible if nit 62 St);
B0 if the need is instead met with an outside good.
The benet Bit of meeting the need with open source software is assumed to be a
random variable revealed to the programmer when he must decide on an action. The
programming and sharing costs, E and K are assumed to be strictly positive. The altruism
parameter ait 2 f0;ag is stochastic and varies across programmers and over time. Assume
that Probfait = ajait dt = 0g =  if programmer i meets his need using open source
software at t. In intervals in which programmer i does not meet a need by open source
altruism decays at a Posson random time, i.e. it follows a continuous time Markov process
with Probfait = 0jait dt = ag = dt and Probfait = ajait dt = 0g = 0.
The set of needs that can be met with the open source software grows when agents share
code they have written. Assume that each feature of the software exogenously disappears
at Poisson rate . The motivation is that features become obsolete due to changes in
interacting hardware and software.
We assume that agents can only observe aggregate behavior when they make their
decisions. They understand the primitive parameters of the model, and they observe St
(and thus qt); as well as the realizations of random variables corresponding to their own
outcomes. Whenever they are called on to take an action they myopically maximize their
payo from the current action.6
3 Developer Behavior and Community Dynamics
In this section we analyze the model described in Section 2.
3.1 Programmer Behavior
We begin with some fairly straightforward observations about programmer behavior in the
baseline model. We organize the discussion by listing the observations as propositions.
6Given that agents only observe aggregates when making their decision the assumption of myopic play
is similar to assuming that players play a sequential equilibrium of the dynamic game. The one dierence is
that a patient programmer would in some situations use open source software even though this is suboptimal
in the short run, because he knows that will change his future utility function and allow him to receive the
benets that altruists receive when they behave altruistically. We do not think that this sophisticated
behavior seems realistic.
7Proposition 1 If a < K then no features are ever added to the open source software.
Software quality decays at an exponential rate, qt = q0e t.
Proposition 2 Programmers use open source if it can meet their needs and Bit > B0.
This is an immediate consequence of the assumptions. Meeting the need by program-
ming is dominated because E > 0. The `program-and-contribute' option is only available
if the feature is not already in the open source package.
Proposition 3 Suppose that an programmer's need cannot be met by the open source soft-
ware, that is, nit 62 St. Then
(a) If a < K then the programmer develops the feature if Bit > B0 + E.
(b) If a > K then the programmer develops the feature and contributes it to the code base
if Bit > B0 + E   (a   K).
A few comments about this proposition are in order. First, there is clearly a public
goods problem. In the absence of altruism, programmers will develop features accounting
only for their own private benets, and they will never share their code after developing it
(we have left out direct private benets to publication, such as gaining future support and
improvements for desired features, for simplicity). Second, altruism mitigates the public
goods problem, and in fact there may be too much or too little development relative to the
social optimum, depending on the magnitude of a. Altruism leads to strictly more features
being developed if a > K: Programmers anticipate the utility they will gain from sharing
the code (net of publication costs), and this osets somewhat the private cost of eort.
Indeed, agents may develop features where Bit < B0 (no private benets) if altruism is
important enough.
To simplify the discussion in the remainder of the paper, we make the following assump-
tion:
Assumption 1 Assume a > K.
It then follows immediately that:




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
use open source if nit 2 St and Bit > B0;
program and contribute if nit 62 St; ait = a; and Bit > B0 + E   (a   K);
program if nit 62 St; ait = 0; and Bit > B0 + E;
use outside good if nit 62 St and Bit < B0 + E   minf0;a   Kg
or nit 2 St and Bit < B0:
83.2 Dynamics
The status of the software and its future evolution is described by two state variables: the
quality qt of the software and the mass bt of software programmers with ait = a, i.e. the
fraction who are currently altruistic.
We make the standard continuum-of-agents assumption that the law of large num-
bers holds exactly. We let b denote the ow rate at which an programmer is con-
fronted with a need for which an open source solution would dominate the outside option:
b  ProbfBit > B0g. Similarly, we let q denote the ow rate at which a programmer
is confronted with a need that he would be willing to meet by programming and then
contribute to the code if he were altruistic: q  ProbfBit > B0 + E   (a   K)g.
Proposition 4 The dynamics of quality qt and of the mass of programmers bt are
_ qt = q(1   qt)bt   qt
_ bt = b(1   bt)qt   bt
To gain some intuition for these dynamics, it is useful to begin by deriving the _ b = 0
and _ q = 0 curves. We begin by describing the _ q = 0 curve. It is dened only for some values
of q because when q > q=( +q) we have _ q < 0 for any b 2 (0;1). For q 2 [0;q=( +q)]
we let b_ q(q) denote the value of b at which _ q = 0, that is, the function dened implicitly by






Thus, the function is proportional to the ratio of the rate of decay of altruism and the
arrival rate of programmer needs (=q) as well as the ratio of the fraction of features
currently incorporated to the fraction of features that need to be written (q=(1   q)): This
implies some properties of b_ q() that will be useful for deriving steady states.
Proposition 5 The function b_ q(); which describes the curve along which quality is con-
stant, is convex and strictly increasing on (0;q=(+q)). It satises b_ q(0) = 0, b_ q(q=(+
q)) = 1, and b0
_ q(q) = =q(1   q)2.
In words, b_ q(q) is increasing if for higher values of quality, a higher mass of software
programmers must currently be altruistic in order for the quality of the software to remain
9constant over time. This follows as a result of our assumptions that quality naturally
depreciates, and that new code is only published if a programmer develops the code and
feels enough altruism to outweigh the publication costs. But if a feature currently exists,
it won't be developed in the current time period, and so it won't be published. Thus,
to avoid depreciation of quality, a high fraction of the programmers who develop the few
remaining features must be altruistic and publish their code. Note that we could consider
other models of the potential for quality improvements that do not have this \crowding"
phenomenon; for example, in some settings, it might be that each new feature makes it
possible for many more features to \build on it" and expand the appeal of the product in
new directions.
The function b_ q(q) is convex if the rate of change in the stock of altruism necessary to
compensate for an increase in quality in order to hold quality constant is higher for higher
levels of quality. This again follows directly from our assumptions about how potential
quality improvements relate to the current set of features of the product.
Now we turn to consider how the set of altruistic programmers must change with the
quality of the product in order to keep the fraction of altruistic programmers constant.
Observe that _ b = 0 if and only if
bq = (bq + )b:
For a given q, let b_ b(q) denote the value of b at which _ b = 0, that is, the function dened
implicitly by






Proposition 6 The function b_ b() is concave and strictly increasing on (0;1). It satises
b_ b(0) = 0, b_ b(1) 2 (0;1), and b0
_ b(q) = b=(bq + )2.
In words, b_ b(q) is increasing if for higher values of quality, a higher fraction of software
programmers must currently be altruistic in order for the set of altruistic programmers to
remain constant over time. This holds because the number of programmers who benet
from the software is high when q is high, and this will lead to an increase in the size of the
altruistic population unless the altruistic group is already large enough to have sucient
depreciation. The function b_ b(q) is concave if this eect is less pronouced at higher levels
10of quality. Note that the system has _ b > 0 when b < b_ b(q) and _ b < 0 when b > b_ b(q), so one
can think of b as evolving toward the _ b = 0 curve.
The system is in steady state where b_ q() and b_ b() intersect. Note that the two curves
always intersect at b = q = 0. Hence, (0;0) is always a steady state of the system.
The full behavior of the system follows fairly simply from the properties noted in the
two propositions. Essentially, there are only two possibilities as pictured in Figure 1 below,
which graphs the b_ b and b_ q curves in q-b space. The b_ b curve is concave and the b_ q is convex.
If the b_ q curve is steeper at the origin, the two curves will have no intersections other than
at (0;0), as in the panel on the left. If the b_ b curve is steeper at the origin, then the fact
that the b_ b curve intersects the right side of the square (i.e. b_ b(1) 2 (0;1)) and the b_ q curve
intersects the top side of the square implies that there is an unique interior intersection.








_ b = 0






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































_ b = 0
_ q = 0
Figure 1: Model Dynamics: the left panel has p = 0:5 and b = q =  =  = 1. The right
panel has p = b = q = 1 and  =  = 0:5.









Proposition 7 If bq <  then the only steady-state of the system is q = b = 0.
If bq >  then the model also has a second steady-state with q and b positive.
The condition that bq >  has a very straightforward interpretation: the frequency
with which programmers encounter needs that can be met using the open-source product
and consequent feelings of altruism must occur suciently often relative to the speed at
which altruism and features depreciate. Note that the depreciation of altruism and the
depreciation of features enter symmetrically.
11Solving for the positive steady state state we nd:







From here, we see that the steady-size of the project (and of the altuistic community) is
increasing in bq , the gap between opporunities to add features and develop altruism
relative to the depreciation of features and altruism. We can also compare the growth rate
of quality to the growth rate of altruistic programmers, nding that it depends on the decay
rates. In some extreme cases, we get clear answers: when the decay rate of altruism is low
(  0) we nd that the steady state fraction of altruistic programmers is 1 (b  1); and
when the decay rate of features is close to zero (  0); we get a steady state quality of 1
(q  1).
Simple inspection of the phase diagram for the system leads to the following conclusions.
Proposition 9 If bq <  then the steady state at (q;b) = (0;0) is globally stable.
If bq >  then the system converges to the (q;b) steady-state from every initial
condition other than (q0;b0) = (0;0).
This result implies that the dynamics of the system are deterministic and do not have
history-dependence. Any project that gets o the ground with a few features or committed
(altruistic) programmers will eventually reach a steady state that is predetermined given
parameters. It can also be shown that projects tend to grow with quality and proportion
of altruistic programmers roughly proportional to the steady state values all along the way.
Finally, we observe that the system can exhibit some nonmonotone behavior if we start
from a skewed initial condition. For example, if some formerly commercial software is
made public and thereby starts with q large and b small, then q may drop for a long time
and become quite low before b catches up and allows quality to increase back toward the
steady-state level.
4 Competing with Open Source
An important question for public and business policy concerns how competition between
an OSS product and a commercial product diers from competition between two commer-
cial products, or from monopoly pricing. Consider a single commercial software product
12competing with a single OSS project. We can incorporate this into the model of Section
2 by assuming that the \outside option" that provides utility B0 is a choice between two
goods: the commercial software that provides utility v   p, where v is the customer value
of the commercial software and p is its price; and ignoring the need, which provides utility
0. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that the commercial software can meet all
needs and that all consumers have the same value for the commercial software.
Our model omits direct network eects of the form analyzed by Casadesus-Masanell
and Ghemawat (2006). Instead, we consider the \network eects" that arise endogenously
in our model through the provision of features by altruistic programmers, which has the
eect of making users derive more utility from the open source product if more others have
used it in the past.
If v < p; the commercial rm gets no demand. For v > p; the commercial rm's demand
comes from:
1. Programmers whose needs could be met by open source but have Bit  v   p;
2. Programmers whose needs cannot be met by open source, who are not altruistic, and
who have Bit   E  v   p; and
3. Programmers whose needs cannot be met by open source, who are altruistic, and who
have Bit   E + (a   K)  v   p.
Suppose that Bit has CDF G. Assume that the commercial rm has zero costs. Then, its
ow prot function as a function of the quality of the OSS, the set of altruistic programmers
in the OSS, and the price p of the commercial product (assuming v < p) is
(p;q;b) = p(qG(v   p) + (1   q)(1   b)G(v   p + E) + (1   q)bG(v   p + E   (a   K))):
A basic observation on the form of this prot function is:
Proposition 10 Flow prots are decreasing in the fraction b of programmers who are al-
truistic toward the open source project.
Flow prots are decreasing in the quality q of the open source project if altruistic pro-
grammers are not too altruistic a   K  E, but otherwise will not be monotonically de-
creasing in q.
The reason why prots can be increasing in q is that programmers do not get the
altruism benet if they add a feature to the open source project that is already there.
13Hence, a package lacking a feature can be more attractive than a package with the feature.
When b is large, this eect dominates.
4.1 Static prot maximization
Consider rst the static prot maximization problem:
max
p:pv
p(qG(v   p) + (1   q)(1   b)G(v   p + E) + (1   q)bG(v   p + E   (a   K))):(1)







diG(^ vi   p)
1
A; (2)
with d1 + d2 + d3 = 1, where di is the fraction of total rm consumers coming from
i 2 f1;2;3g; corresponding to the three groups of consumers described above, and ^ vi is the
net benet to the consumer of type i from using the commercial product rather than the
OSS at zero price. The rst-order condition for such a problem is
X
j
djG(^ vj   p)   p
X




j djG(^ vj   p)
P




j djg(^ vj   p)
:
One case in which this expression takes a very simple form is if the distribution of Bit









(v + (1   q)E   (1   q)b(a   K)):
The maximum p = (v + E)=2 occurs when q = b = 0. It has p = v=2 independent of b
whenever q = 1. The price when q = 0 and b = 1 is (v   E   (a   K))=2. Note that if E is
large enough, these calculations could yield p > v which cannot be optimal; in such cases
the rm chooses p = v:
Monopoly pricing in the absence of an OSS competitor is very simple in this example:
the rm charges p = v: Unsurprisingly, the presence of a competitor reduces the optimal
14price. For the uniform case, we see that how the static optimum changes with the quality
of the OSS depends on parameters:
@
@q
p(q;b) = b(a   K)   E:
If programming eort is small relative to altruism benets (weighted by the number of
altruistic programmers), the commercial rm actually increases its price in response to a
higher quality competitor. Otherwise (and always when a   K < E), we obtain the more
intuitive result that a higher quality OSS product leads to a lower best response price by
the commercial rm. It is also straightforward to see that the more altruistic programmers
there are, the lower the optimal price of the commercial product.
4.2 Dynamic prot maximization







_ q = (1   q)b(1   G(v   p + E   (a   s)))   q
_ b = pq(1   b)(1   G(v   p))   b;
where the latter two equations are the laws of motion for the OSS quality and the number
of altruistic programmers, given their choices between OSS and the commercial product.
Note that the programmers are not forward-looking in this model, but rather make myopic
choices based on the ow benets of programming, publishing, or using the commercial
product.
The dynamic problem is pretty straightforward when the altruism parameter is not too
large: a   K < E. In this case, ow prots are decreasing in both q and b. Lowering p
decreases both _ q and _ b. This plus the montonicity of the (q;b) system implies that the rm
will always choose prices that are below the static prot-maximizing levels.
The dynamic price distortions are less straightforward when a   K > E. Recall that
in this case prots are increasing in q when b is large because programmers are suciently
altruistic so as to make them more likely to choose OSS when it works less well (because they
gain utility from improving it). Choosing a higher p increases _ q (although it also increases _ b)
so osetting eects would need to be considered. This case could have interesting dynamics
to explore, but does not seem likely to be empirically relevant, so we will not focus on it in
the remainder of this paper.
154.3 Magnitudes of stratgic price distortions
Consider the \standard" case where a commercial rm does better when the open source
product is lower in quality (a   K < E). Lowering prices away from the static optimum
has no rst-order cost and gives a rst-order dynamic benet, so the commercial rm
will \distort" prices downward from the static optimum. The magnitude of the dierence
between static and dynamically optimal prices will depend on several fractors: there is
less cost to distorting prices when the commercial rm's quantity is low; the benet from
distorting prices by a given amount is larger when the eect on the state variables (q;b) is
larger; and the benet of shifting the state variables by a given amount is larger when the
dynamics are such that the shifts will be more long-lived.
To get some feel for how these considerations play out, Figure 2 graphs the dierence
between the static optimal and the dynamic optimal prices as a function of q and b for one
set of parameters.7 In this case, strategic price distortion is largest when the system is near
the steady state of the static model ((q;b)  (0:3174;0:2876)) and drops sharply near each
of the extreme states, including that where the open-source product is very weak.
Most of the intuition for this is obtained from thinking about the vector eld describing
the evolution of the system under static-optimal pricing, which is graphed in Figure 3. The
incentive to distort prices is high when the state is near the steady state, because the system
moves very slowly in these cases and hence manipulations that shift the state pay o for a
long period of time. Distortions are very small when the state is close to (1;0), (0;1), or
(1;1) for analogous reasons: the dynamics move away from these points very quickly so the
benets of manipulation are small. The reason for not pricing aggressively when the open-
source product is in its infancy are dierent. The system moves slowly in a neighborhood
of (0;0) so shifts in the state yield long-lasting benets. But price cuts have only a small
eect on the evolution of the system (
d_ q
dp and d_ b
dp are both zero at (q;b) = (0;0)), so there is
not much incentive to sacrice short-run prots for this reason.
Because the commercial rm mostly distorts prices when prices are near the steady state
for these parameter values, the dynamics are qualitatively similar regardless of whether the
monopolist practices static- and dynamic-optimal pricing. The steady state size of the open
source project, however, is somewhat lower with dynamic pricing.
7Values Bit are assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution on [0;10]. Costs and benets of adding
features are a = 2, K = 1, and E = 2. Probability of becoming altruistic is  = 0:7. Depreciation rates are
 =  = 0:5. Other parameters are r = 0:05, v = 3, and  = 1.
16Figure 2: Strategic price distortions: the dierence between the static and dynamic optimal
price as a function of (q;b) for one set of parameters.
17Figure 3: The vector eld (_ q; _ b) of the system under static-optimal pricing.
185 Models with Customer Support
Our baseline model neglected a feature of OSS that has received a lot of attention in the
descriptive literature about OSS: only a small fraction of the OSS community actually
contributes to the code base.8 More people help out by providing support service to new
users, answering questions posted to bulletin boards. Providing this support is probably
quite important for many products. Shah (2004, 2006) notes that users providing this casual
support appear to have a shorter period of active involvement with the project. That is,
many consumers adopt the software, receive help from others, and then proceed to provide
help to others for a period of time. In contrast, experienced programmers rarely spend time
answering basic questions for \newbies."
This type of phenomenon can have important implications for the dynamics of OSS,
since it suggests that a regular ow of new users is important for maintaining customer ser-
vice. The behavior of users can be understood through the lens of altruism that depreciates
over time, and perhaps also due to the decline in intellectual satisfaction from answering
similar questions over a long period of time. Thus, we consider a model like that of the
previous section but with two populations: a unit mass of software programmers and a
mass m of \users" who potentially contribute by providing service rather than new code.
Suppose that when a \user" encounters a need he or she cannot meet the need by open
source unless the code has that feature and he or she gets help from another user. To
keep the specication similar to the above model (but slightly simpler) we assume that
users' needs that would be met with open source (if this is possible) arise according to
a Poisson process with parameter u, that users who meet their needs using open source
become altruistic with probability u; and that their altruism decays according to a Poisson
process with parameter u. Assume that the probability of being able to use the code is
qtf(mct), where ct is the fraction of users who are altruistic at t and f is some concave
function.9
There are several interesting options for extending our specication of software pro-
grammer preferences. We proceed to analyze a couple of these.
8Again, Shah (2004, 2006) does a very nice job of providing descriptions and analysis.
9One might want to specify this f(ct) to reect that each user will only provide a xed amount of
customer service that is independent of the size of the user population.
195.1 Code-base altruism
One way to extend the model is to assume that software programmers do not need service,
and that they receive altruism benets directly from increasing the code base (as opposed
to indirectly through providing benets to other users). This might correspond more to
feelings of intellectual satisfaction or scientic achievement from contributing to a high-
quality product. In this case, the q and b dynamics of the model are identical to those in
the benchmark model, since users do not have an impact on programmers' objectives.
The fraction of users who are altruistic then evolves according to
_ ct = uu(1   ct)qtf(mct)   uct
From our analysis of the baseline model, we know that (qt;bt) ! (q;b) from any initial
condition other than (0;0) provided that bq   > 0. When the latter condition holds,
the dynamics of c for large t are then approximately
_ ct = uu(1   ct)qf(mct)   uct
= uu(qf(mct)   uct)   qf(mct)ct:
Proposition 11 If uuqmf0(0) < u then in the limit use of the software goes to zero.
If uuqmf0(0) > u then use will not converge to zero if c0 > 0. In the special case
where f(x) = x=m, the fraction of users who are altruistic converges to c =
uuq u
uuq .
This result shows that service issues can lead an OSS project to be something that is
tailored for programmers, but does not meet the needs of ordinary users. Industry observers
have commented that OSS projects tend to be biased in this direction, and that commercial
products cater more to unsophisticated users. The result highlights the important role
played by the slope of the \service function" f at 0 : it is important that the rst few
users are able to eectively support other users in order to prevent the collapse of service.
Clearly, if f0(0) is large (e.g. if one user is able to answer all questions for incoming users),
collapse of the user base is not a concern. This suggests that when trying to get an OSS
project o the ground in terms of user adoption, it may make a big dierence if a few
committed participants in an OSS project provide a lot of initial support.
Even when collapse of the user base is not a concern, when u is large (so that user
altruism depreciates quickly), service issues can greatly limit the use of the product. Again,
this result is consistent with observations by industry observers that support is a critical
issue for OSS projects. However, by assumption, low support does not limit the development
20of the project, just the rate of user adoption. We consider in the next section a perhaps
more realistic variant of the model, where programmer motivation depends on the size of
the user base.
5.2 User-motivated altruism
Surveys of OSS participants indicate that programmers want to have an impact with their
contributions, much as academics do. They appear to enjoy being part of important
projects, including projects that have a large user base.10 This suggests that a model
should incorporate a relationship between altruism and the extent to which code is helpful
to casual users. We develop such a model in this section and note that it leads to important
qualitative changes in the dynamics.
The ow rate at which any feature will meet users's needs is muf(mct). If we assume
that programmers have \myopic altruism" in the sense that the altruism benet depends
on the ow rate of use of the feature at the time of development (rather than some innite
horizon discounted measure of total use), then the altruism benet from contributing a
feature at t is amuf(mct).11
A simple way to incorporate the idea that programmers are more likely to develop a
feature if the feature will be used more is to assume that Bit is always greater than B0 +E
and that the publication cost K is a random variable distributed uniformly on [0;a].12 This
implies that the probability that an programmer decides to contribute a feature to the code
base is muf(mct).13
The evolution of qt and bt is no longer separable from the evolution of ct.
Proposition 12 The dynamics of the system are given by
_ qt = q(1   qt)btmuf(mct)   qt
_ bt = b(1   bt)qt   bt
_ ct = uu(1   ct)qtf(mct)   uct
10Shah (2006) quotes one programmer on this: \Why work on something that no on will use? There's no
satisfaction there." Other supporting evidence includes that some programmers report that they monitor
discussions of features they have developed even though they rarely take part in them.
11This also assumes as we've done implicitly throughout that the fact that others might invent the feature
anyway in the future also doesn't aect altruism benets.
12The assumption on Bit implies that the active margin is between developing versus developing and
contributing. The expressions would be more complicated if lower \altruism" benets led engineers to
switch to the outside good. The assumption also implies that b = q.
13This assumes that the expression for the altruism benet is always less than one.
21As above, it is always a steady state to have no activity.
Proposition 13 The system always has (q;b;c) = (0;0;0) as a steady state.
The presence of a steady state at zero activity is not a dierence from the previous
model, but the nature of the dynamics in the neighborhood of this steady state turns out
to be an important dierence. To analyze the stability of the zero activity steady state we
linearize the dynamics in a neighborhood of (0;0;0). Assuming that f has a nite derivative
at 0 the rst order approximation to the dynamics is
_ qt   qt
_ bt  bqt   bt
_ ct   uct
If we write this in matrix form as at (_ q; _ b; _ c) = A(q;b;c), then the A matrix is negative
denite. This implies
Proposition 14 The steady state at (q;b;c) = (0;0;0) is locally asymptotically stable.
Note that the behavior of this model is qualitatively dierent from the model with
\code-based altruism." In our model of user-motivated altruism, an open-source project
will need to be pushed to a sucient level of development by some mechanism other than
the ordinary altruism-fed growth in order to have any chance of succeeding. This suggests an
important role for highly motivated and altruistic \founding members" of an OSS project,
and in particular, these members need to both develop software and provide user support.
Proposition 15 For some parameters, the steady state at (q;b;c) = (0;0;0) will be a global
attractor.
For other parameters the system will also have a steady state with q, b, and c positive.
To see that the zero-quality steady state can be unique, note that _ q and _ b in this model
are always less than they were in the baseline model. In that model, (qt;bt) always converged
to zero if bq < . Hence, with that parameter restriction q and b will also converge to
zero in this model. When this happens, c must also converge to zero.
To see that there can also be steady states in which the open source software is successful
note that for c = 0 and c0 = 1 we have ct = 1 for all t. The system is then just like the
previous system with the substitutions b0 = b, q0  qmuf(m) and 0  . If we the
22primitives of the model are such that 00b0q > , the system will have a steady state
with q and b positive.
Note that the model of this section has more nuanced predictions about what makes for
a successful launch of an OSS project. For example, how high should (q;b;c) be in order
to get o the ground. The example given above indicates that quality and programmer
altruism can be quite low if the customer base is high and altruism among customers does
not decay too much.
5.2.1 Competing with open source
The strategy for competing with an open-source product can be very dierent in our \user-
motivated altruism" model. If the model has multiple stable steady states, then there
is large permanent benet from shifting the state into the basin of attraction of the zero-
quality state. Hence, one would expect a commercial rm to follow such a strategy whenever
the initial state is not too far from this basin.
How exactly this will be done can vary depending on the parameters of the model and
whether the commercial rm has additional instruments other than price. For example,
whenever f(0) = 0 the dynamics converge to the zero-quality from any state with ct = 0.
Hence, one strategy for eliminating the OSS competitor may be to take actions to attract
as many ordinary users as possible, e. g. by providing high levels of support, which
will diminishing the motivation of potential OSS developers. In general, an important
consideration will be how far the initial state is from the basin of attraction of the zero-
quality equilibrium in each dimension.
Although we have focused our discussion of strategic pricing on a commercial rm com-
peting with open source, one could also bring out similar (albeit opposite) considerations for
a rm that wishes to promote an OSS project. In particular, our model of user-motivated
altruism provides one potential model to explain why some commercial rms have made
very large short-term investments in supporting open-source projects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed several simple models of the dynamics of OSS. We have
also explored the implications of these models for (i) successful initial launches of OSS
projects and (ii) competing with OSS projects.
In our base model OSS will always has a steady-state with zero activity even if it also
has a steady state with positive activity. Our model, however, is not like a standard network
23externality model { the system converges to the higher steady state given any initial boost
no matter how small. We also found that, although the dynamics of OSS projects typically
vary with parameters and state variables in intuitive ways, it is possible that increasing the
quality of an OSS can have perverse eects. We can also observe nonmonotone dynamics
with quality or the population of committed programmers initially decreasing and then
later increasing toward the steady state.
Commercial rms competing with OSS projects can benet from strategic foresight.
Generally, a far-sighted commercial rm should price lower than a short-sighted one. This
never eliminates OSS competition in our base model, but keeping price low does slows the
quality growth of the OSS. How far prices are distorted depends on the parameters of the
model and the current state of the OSS product. We noted that distortions may be largest
when the OSS project is near its steady-state quality, because the benets of reducing OSS
quality are larger when the reductions are longer-lasting.
The fact that our base model does not have multiple stable equilibria may be a useful
insight into OSS movements, but we think of it more as pointing out that one must incor-
porate other elements into a model to explain why the way in which an OSS product is
launched could matter in the long run. Our analysis of user support is one such extension.
It illustrates that it may be dicult to get an OSS o the ground without a core group of
founders committed to providing customer support. If programmers are motivated by the
size of the user base, such considerations may make it impossible to get an OSS project
started, at least for some parameter values.
When user support is an important phenomenon, and when user altruism depreciates
over time, strategic pricing by a commercial rm can eliminate the user base of an OSS
project. If a primary motivation for programmers is the size of the user base who will use
additional features, strategic pricing can potentially push an OSS into a zero-quality steady
state. There is also greater scope for commercial rms to support OSS projects in such
case as providing short-run support may change the long-run outcome in the market.
Many avenues remain to be explored. Our models are very stylized. We hope this may
be an advantage in two ways: one could develop microfoundations for some assumptions
to make them less sylized; or one could leave the model as it is and take advantage of the
tractability to add other considerations. One aspect of OSS communities that strikes us as
potentially interesting is the heterogeneity in the governance structures of OSS projects. It
seems natural that dierent structures could aect the rate at which programmers develop
altruistic feelings. Another important consideration that we have avoided in this paper is
24career concerns. While we felt that altruistic motivations were relatively understudied, we
would not deny that career concerns are also relevant and could interact with altruistic
motivations in interesting ways.
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